The recent growth of Experimental Semiotics (ES) offers us a new option to investigate human communication. We briefly introduce ES, presenting results from three themes of research which emerged within it. Then we illustrate the contribution ES can make to the investigation of human communication systems, particularly in comparison with the other existing options. This comparison highlights how ES can provide an engine of discovery for understanding human communication. In fact, in complementing the other options, ES offers us unique opportunities to test assumptions about communicative behavior, both through the experimenters' planned manipulations and through the unexpected behaviors humans exhibit in experimental settings. We provide three examples of such opportunities, one from each of the three research themes we present.
Introduction
Human communication systems are complex systems which organize the behaviors of many individuals into a culturally shared set of conventions [46, 74, 76] . Investigating experimentally such complex systems as they emerge and evolve within human communities is challenging and, in consequence, researchers typically opt for simulations with artificial agents (e.g., [2] ). In the last few years a new option has become available [11, 70] . Researchers who take up this option -which will here be referred to as Experimental Semiotics (henceforth ES) -conduct controlled studies with human adults in which communication systems emerge de novo in the laboratory (e.g., [7, 11, 19, 27, 62] ) or novel structure emerges in systems provided to participants (e.g., [37, 57, 64] ). Experimental semioticians typically ask people to play collaborative games in virtual environments. While these games adults, b highlighting the important role of computational simulations and research with animals in complementing ES. Indeed, the two key elements of duality of patterning have been observed in communication systems developed by artificial agents (see [49, 66, 75] for compositionality and [48, 52, 77] for combinatoriality), as well as in the natural communication systems of animals (see [1] for compositionality and [44] for combinatoriality).
Social factors in communication
The second core question addressed by experimental semioticians is this: What role do social factors play in the emergence and evolution of human communication systems? Experimental semioticians have tackled this question at two different levels. At the level of dyads, they have shown that the development of symbols (i.e., communication forms the meaning of which is purely conventional) depends on the degree of interaction in the dyads. In particular, the more interdependent the interaction, the higher the degree of symbolicity of the communication systems developed by the dyads [19, 27] . Symbolicity is another key feature of human languages and so this result strengthens the parallel drawn above between communication systems studied by experimental semioticians and natural language. At the level of small communities, experimental semioticians have obtained a number of results. First, they have shown that small communities of interacting dyads will globally converge on simplified and symbolic communication systems [10] . These systems are different for different communities and are easier to learn than systems developed by isolated pairs [9] . Second, experimental semioticians have addressed an interesting theoretical difference which has arisen within the community of researchers who study language as a product of cultural evolution. Some researchers focus on intergenerational transmission processes (e.g., [36] ); other researchers focus on intragenerational communicative processes [54, 69] . This difference reverberates in ES where some researchers study diffusion chains [4, 37] and others interacting dyads or small communities (e.g., [11, 19, 62, 64] ). Garrod and his colleagues [20] directly contrasted diffusion chains and interactive dyads, concluding that the latter but not the former lead to systematic simplification and increasing symbolicity. Independently of whether this conclusion will withstand future tests, the study by Garrod et al. illustrates the potential of ES for empirically addressing theoretical issues. Finally, a study in ES has shown how frequency of interaction and group conflict affect linguistic divergence in groups of interacting individuals [57] . Specifically, teams of players used an artificial language in order to negotiate transactions in a game. Through frequent interaction, players became able to identify one another on the basis of linguistic cues, and this led to substantial linguistic divergence between players when the negotiations occurred in the context of a competitive version of the game. Considering that the game lasted only a few tens of minutes, this study suggests that, when human interactions are both conflictive and frequent, linguistic divergence occurs at a very fast pace.
The bootstrapping of communication
The third core question addressed by experimental semioticians is this: How do humans bootstrap a communication system? Experimental semioticians have tackled this question examining successes and failures in their studies. This has provided a number of insights. The first one is that the fundamental mechanism people use to bootstrap communication [11] is similar to the mechanism of interactive alignment described by Garrod and colleagues in the context of conversations using natural language [18, 21] . In other words, the bootstrapping of communication might rely on a mechanism that is not different in kind from the mechanism that facilitates convergence on the fine details of how to use pre-established forms of communication [11] . The similarity between novel and pre-established communication systems is not confined to the fundamental mechanisms for alignment. Galantucci observed that the behavior of the players in his study reflected the efficient integration of explicit communicative acts (the use of signs) with information implicitly available to players and silent behavior-coordinating procedures [11] . Such efficient integration is typical of natural language use [3, 25, 72] . Together, these results strengthen once more the parallel drawn above between communication systems studied by experimental semioticians and natural language. Another conclusion concerning the bootstrapping of communication is that it relies on implicit coordination mechanisms. In particular, Galantucci found that explicit negotiations about the meaning of specific signs were not necessarily beneficial for bootstrapping communication systems in his game [12] , a finding which again parallels a finding with natural language [18] . Indeed, unless players had a keen ability to coordinate their joint attention and actions -in which case they typically engaged in explicit negotiations sparingly and greatly benefited from them -players were easily led to utter confusion by such negotiations [12; see also 16] Consistent with this conclusion, Scott-Phillips and his colleagues found that when default implicit coordination procedures were made more difficult to establish, failures in bootstrapping a communication system occurred much more frequently than when such procedures were easier to establish [62] .
In sum, despite its brief existence, ES has already flourished in different directions, providing new opportunities to address a set of very diverse issues. In the next section we focus on the opportunities offered by ES which make it act as an engine of discovery for understanding human communication. In particular, we will illustrate three such opportunities, one from each of the themes presented above.
ES as an Engine of Discovery
In order to illustrate how ES provides an engine of discovery for understanding human communication, we will first situate ES in the context of other approaches for studying human communication. The most direct approaches to studying human communication involve studying samples of natural languages (e.g., [8, 43] ) or the use of language in natural contexts (e.g., [24, 58] ). These approaches -which, for convenience, will be here collectively referred to as the Natural Approach (henceforth NA) -have the clear advantage of getting their data from real agents (humans) interacting in real environments (the world). However, this advantage is also a major drawback. Focusing on real agents in real environments implies the lack of experimental control, which in turn implies scarce opportunities for uncovering causal relations. Moreover, considering that, with a few partial exceptions [23, 33, 60] , humans do not develop natural communication systems de novo, the NA is not ideal for studying the emergence and evolution of human communication.
The most radical response to these limitations has been that of studying artificial simulations of the human world, where by artificial we mean created by the scientist so as to be fully manipulable (e.g., [6, 30, 31, 35, 42, 50, 65, 68] ). This approachwhich, for convenience, will be here referred to as the Artificial Approach (henceforth AA) -has offered us a number of insights concerning human communication, particularly regarding its emergence and evolution [2, 38, 67] . However, this radical response does not come without its own problems. Human communication is a complex phenomenon and, as such, it is governed by a dense network of hard-toidentify causal relations. Typically, investigators who adopt the AA dramatically reduce the complexity of this network by making a substantial number of simplifying assumptions. If the conclusions reached by the AA are to contribute to the scientific understanding of the natural phenomena the AA intends to model, such assumptions must be tested. One way in which this has been done is that of embodying artificial agents and situating their communicative interactions in real physical environments (e.g., [55, 69] ). Indeed, this move has taught us a lot about the causal networks originating from physical interactions occurring in a realistic world (e.g., [71] ). Another way to test the assumptions made by investigators who adopt the AA is that of studying the behavior of real humans interacting in artificial environments, that is, of performing ES studies.
c These studies provide two kinds of opportunities for testing assumptions about human behavior. The first consists of the planned tests which experimental semioticians perform to verify computational models (e.g., [37] ) or to contrast different theories (e.g., [20] [26] . In the standard version of the game, two participants are paired up anonymously for a one-shot interaction in which one member (the proposer) is given a sum of money to divide between the pair. Any division of the sum is permitted but, if the other member (the responder) of the pair refuses the offer, neither member gets anything. If we assumed, following traditional economic theories, that both parties would act exclusively according to rational self-interest, we would expect the proposer to offer as little as possible and the responder to accept any nonzero amount. This is indeed the strategy of choice for chimpanzees [32] , but not for humans. On average, human proposers offer 40% to the responder, and the responders reject 16% of offers [51] . In other words, participants apply rules of fairness (e.g., "do not offer too little"; "refuse offers that are too small") that are optimized for repeated and non-anonymous interactions, that is, the kind of interactions they most often encounter in their daily lives. The important point is that this kind of finding is not a drawback of experiments with humans, but an advantage, as these experiments offer opportunities to reveal fundamental human biases. In what follows we provide two further examples of such opportunities, this time from our own ES research.
Egocentric failures
The first example relates to the theme discussed in Sec. 2.3 and comes from two studies performed by Galantucci and his colleagues with dyads of participants [11, 15] . One of the consistent results in the two studies was that some players failed in developing even a minimal communication system, in 2-3 hours of playing. Such failures persisted when people played the game in teams of three [17] . Indeed, in half of the triads studied by Galantucci and colleagues there was a player who, in six hours of playing, did not learn any of the signs produced by the other two players in the team. Most of these stark failures were due to an unexpected factor: communicative egocentrism [12] . For example, some players did not make any use of the one device they had at their disposal to communicate with their partners (a small digitizing pad) for as long as two consecutive hours, often while the partner tried repeatedly to initiate some form of communication. These players sometimes made use of the signs generated by the partner, demonstrating an understanding of the basic dynamics of the game. However, the idea of reciprocating the communicative acts initiated by the partner was not obvious to them, suggesting a severe egocentric limitation. This conclusion is consistent with the behavior of other players who were successful at the game but developed signs which had different meaning depending on something that they privately controlled -the vertical component of the tracings they drew on a digitizing pad -but which was not publicly perceivable. For example, some players drew a vertical line on the pad from top to bottom to indicate that their agent was moving down in the environment and from bottom to top to indicate that their agent was moving up in the environment. Given the constraints of the communication medium, the two drawings led to identical tracings on the screen seen by the partner (as well as by the drawer). However, the drawings felt different to the tracer's hand and, for this reason, not only were they used as different signs but were also expected to be understood as such. Similar forms of communicative egocentrism have been documented before in the context of spoken conversation [34] , but it seems that communicative egocentrism becomes stronger in the context of the semiotic games used by Galantucci and colleagues.
In conclusion, Galantucci and colleagues learned something unexpected from their experiments: The bootstrapping of communication implies the overcoming of potent egocentric biases. This conclusion is fairly surprising if we consider that all of the participants in the studies by Galantucci and colleagues were adults who regularly used sophisticated forms of communication in their lives (e.g., spoken and written language).
Identification strategies
The second example relates to the theme discussed in Sec. 2.2 and comes from a study performed by Roberts [56] . In that study, groups of four participants played a social game consisting of a series of rounds. In each of the rounds, every player was paired anonymously with one of the others and had to negotiate resource exchanges by typing messages in an artificial "alien language." In one of the conditions of the game, the four participants were divided into two teams of two. Over different rounds, participants played half the time with their teammate and half with their opponents. Since it was beneficial to give resources to teammates and to receive them from anyone, but detrimental to give resources to opponents, identifying one's anonymous interlocutor was important. However, players were told whether they had been paired with an opponent or a teammate only at the end of the round, after any resource exchange had taken place. Under such conditions, there was a significant tendency for team "dialects" to evolve in the initially uniform alien language -that is, a given participant's language became more like their teammate's language than their opponents' language. For example, both members of one team might prefer to refer to a resource with the alien word lale -the form given to participants at the start of the game -while the other team might prefer the form lele -a variant that initially arose through error. However, if we assume that participants were employing strategies optimized to the game, it is not clear that we should have expected the development of team dialects. Indeed, given that the primary goal was to be identifiable to one's teammate, participants would have done better by developing distinctive idiolects, that is, individual variants of the alien language that their teammates would recognize.
But this is not what the majority of participants did. Instead they interpreted a pressure for greater identifiability as a pressure for greater alignment : They aligned their language more to that of their teammates than to that of their opponents, and this led to dialect formation [56, 57] . Alignment is not an optimal strategy in two ways. First, it takes more effort, as it involves at least three steps: (a) identifying one's teammate; (b) observing the teammate's language; and (c) adjusting one's own language. The idiolect strategy, in contrast, involves only the first and the third step. The second reason the alignment strategy is less good is that it is open to everyone. Since it is no harder for one's opponents to align themselves to one's teammate, alignment should not make anyone more identifiable.
Why did participants choose a suboptimal strategy? The answer recalls the lesson offered by the Ultimatum Game: We cannot assume that participants will employ strategies optimized to the game we engage them in. In this case participants were biased toward aligning preferentially to those with whom they interacted the most [53, 59] or identified the most [40, 41] . In the real world, where cooperative networks are large and learning to recognize the idiolects of all members is impractical, this strategy is clearly more efficient.
Novel manipulations
There is another sense in which ES provides an engine of discovery for understanding human communication. ES is not only useful as a means of testing the assumptions of the AA but it also offers the possibility of uncovering phenomena which would be hard to uncover through the NA. In fact, experimental semioticians can manipulate factors the effects of which might not be appreciated via the NA because, in the natural world, such factors have little, if any, variation. Such novel manipulations can lead to important insights. For instance, the role that gravity plays in determining the forms of life on earth was not fully appreciated until we had opportunities to run experiments in environments with gravity levels different from those typical of our planet [47] . Through the use of artificial environments, ES offers similar opportunities. This will be illustrated with an example relating to the theme discussed in Sec. 2.1.
Galantucci and colleagues manipulated the rapidity with which forms faded in the medium used by players to communicate in a ES game [15] . Rapidity of fading did not affect the pace with which sign systems were developed in the game, nor did it affect the efficacy with which these systems supported communication. In other words, rapidly fading forms afforded the same opportunities for communication as forms that faded more slowly. However, rapidity of fading had a profound effect on the type of sign systems developed by the players. In particular, in systems developed with rapidly fading forms, the individual forms were reused and combined much more frequently than in systems developed with more slowly fading forms. Considering that speech fades rapidly, Galantucci and colleagues argued that one of the core design principles of spoken language, combinatoriality, may be influenced by a simple physical property of the medium in which speech is implemented. Independently from the validity of this argument, the study provides an important insight. Rapidity of fading had been long identified as one of the design features of natural language [29] . However, its potential effects on the design of natural language have never been appreciated before. This is most likely due to the fact that, in terms of rapidity of fading, all natural languages evolved under identical circumstances and thus we had no opportunities to learn about the effects of that factor. It is interesting to notice that the AA has a similar potential for novel manipulations as ES. However, we are not aware of any study within the AA which introduces such manipulations in an artificial environment. We believe that this is not by chance. Since everything in a fully artificial environment is under the control of the researcher, there is a strong pressure to justify the assumptions made in designing it, and this constrains the researcher's freedom to introduce manipulations that do not reflect reality.
Conclusions
In this paper we have briefly introduced a new field of research -Experimental Semiotics -and argued that it can provide an engine of discovery for understanding human communication. In particular, we have focused on three specific research themes within ES: linguistic properties as the consequence of communication; social factors in communication; and the bootstrapping of communication. With respect to the first of these, research has suggested that many features of human language may be due to the nature of communication itself, rather than language-specific biases. Research on the second theme has clearly indicated that the form and structure of communication systems cannot be understood without reference to a variety of social factors -such as inter-and intra-generational transmission, frequency of interaction, and competition (or cooperation) between speakers. Research on the third has shown that, while explicit negotiation may hinder the bootstrapping of new communication systems, the mechanisms that support such bootstrapping are likely the same as the mechanisms which support successful use of natural language.
We have also emphasized the contribution of ES in the context of other approaches to studying communication: the Natural Approach and the Artificial Approach. We have argued that ES complements these approaches by allowing us to test our assumptions about human behavior in two ways. Some of the tests are built into the experiments by the researchers; others originate in the unexpected behavior of participants. This capacity for experiments to challenge well-established scientific assumptions about human behavior has become clear in the field of economics. Cross-cultural experimental research has uncovered no society whose members behave according to the old-fashioned canonical model of homo economicus [28] . Indeed, by now it seems reasonable to say not only that experimental methods have changed the theoretical landscape of economics, but that the methodology has become part of the mainstream [5, 61] . It is our hope that, by following a similar path, Experimental Semiotics will soon become part of the standard toolkit for research into language and communication.
